Reports & Papers

By looking beyond solely Iran’s security motivations, this paper by Sahar Nowrouzzadeh seeks to inform more holistic negotiation strategies that can potentially influence Iran’s nuclear decision-making in a manner more favorable to U.S. interests.

The development of North Korea’s nuclear program has been accompanied by a spectrum of emotions, from fear to anxiety, from resentment to amazement. Despite its isolation, North Korea has continued its relentless pursuit of nuclear capabilities. While angering neighboring countries, North Korea has equally demonstrated an unparalleled resolve, unwavering commitment to its security ambitions, and extraordinary ingenuity in overcoming the international sanction regime’s technical challenges. Whereas the debate over North Korea, especially in the West, has been predominantly confined to the discussion over its nuclear arsenal, its delivery system, and its ill-formed nuclear posture, much less has been discussed over the nuclear safety culture that ultimately rules over the management of an ever-extending nuclear infrastructure. And in the debate that does exist in this regard, diverging views have emerged. For some commentators, the fact that North Korea has never witnessed a major nuclear accident is simply a miracle. For others, the depiction of North Korea as a “walking nuclear disaster in waiting” is not only exaggerated but also merely inaccurate

China launched its nuclear-weapon program in 1955 and began producing HEU and plutonium in 1964 and 1966, respectively. China exploded its first fission device (HEU-based) on October 16, 1964 and detonated its first hydrogen bomb on June 14, 1967. Since its first nuclear explosion, China has maintained a nuclear policy featuring a no-first-use pledge. China ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on March 9, 1992. China has kept secret information about its fissile materials and nuclear weapons stocks. It is estimated that China had about 360 warheads in 2020, slowly increasing over recent decades. The U.S. missile-defense program is a major driver of China’s nuclear-weapon modernization, which includes an expansion of its nuclear arsenal and more and improved intercontinental ballistic missiles. China conducted 45 nuclear tests from 1964 to 1996 at its Lop Nor site in Xinjiang. Its last nuclear test was in July 1996. In September 1996, China signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty but has not yet ratified it. Most likely, China is waiting to see if the U.S. will ratify.

The world has grown more dangerous but also less open to arms control measures that could limit some of the dangers. What can be done? Steven E. Miller offers a tour de force overview of both dismal and hopeful trends within arms control over the past decades, in this first paper of a new HCSS series on Arms Control.

Under the guidance of its self-defence nuclear strategy, China will continue to modernise its nuclear force in order to maintain a reliable second-strike retaliatory capability. China’s nuclear weapon modernisation has been responsive to the advances of military capabilities of other countries, particularly the US. As Hu Side emphasised, “The sole purpose for China to maintain a limited nuclear counterattack force is to deter a potential nuclear strike. However, the development of US missile defense and the long-rang strike capability with high accuracy to target mobile missiles is in practice to decrease the effectiveness of Chinese nuclear deterrence. Thus, it surely leads to Chinese attention."

Recently published documents, news reports, and other sources of open source information indicate that China is accelerating its current nuclear force modernization programme. It is clear that it is driven largely in response to the growing United States (U.S.) missile defense program, which China perceives as a threat to its minimum credible deterrence. While China is not altering its nuclear doctrine, it believes that it needs to enhance the reliability, survivability, and effectiveness of its retaliatory capability in response to a first-strike. In addition to expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal, it is enhancing its delivery capabilities, for example, by increasing the number of ICBMs and making them more sophisticated. It is building more Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads as well as a new class of ballistic missile submarines. China’s ongoing nuclear modernization aims to increase the survivability, reliability, safety, and penetration capability of its small nuclear arsenal and thereby assures a limited, reliable, and effective counterattack capability that will deter a nuclear first-strike. China’s nuclear modernization program will likely continue to be guided by its nuclear policy, which is characterized by a no-first-use pledge and a commitment to “minimum nuclear deterrence.” Finally, while China supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons, it does not believe it is in China’s interest to participate in discussions about nuclear disarmament until the U.S. and Russia reduce their arsenals to one thousand each, or lower.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has significantly impacted nuclear facilities, it is not the first crisis to do so. This paper will review the findings from the handbook published by Kings College and the Stimson Center, “Nuclear Security in Times of Crisis.” The handbook draws on lessons learned from four case studies that examine what happens to nuclear security during emergencies. Each case varies in terms of cause, scale, and duration, while the lessons are broadly applicable to nuclear facilities and regulatory bodies. Each case identifies steps taken to protect nuclear facilities and identifies areas for improvement.

The International Nuclear Security Forum and the Henry L. Stimson Center are pleased to present a pilot catalogue of civil society capacity building, assistance, and/or research programs. The catalogue highlights for all interested parties, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Member States, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, INTERPOL, and industry stakeholders, civil society’s contributions to strengthen nuclear security and nonproliferation. By providing a uniform product, interested parties will be able to easily identify programs, experts, and organizations that support different areas of nuclear security. In total, 18 organizations submitted 64 projects to the catalogue, the majority of which were think tanks and research or academic institutes. These civil society organizations were spread across five continents, with ten organizations based in the United States, two in Austria, and the rest coming from India, Ghana, Georgia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Australia.

In the World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2021, Mariana Budjeryn writes about the Chernobyl disaster 35 years later, while Ali Ahmad writes about nuclear power and climate change resilience.

The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control hosted two roundtables—in September 2019 and March 2021—to identify lessons that should be drawn from the archive of Iranian documents seized by Israel in 2018, related to the effectiveness of export controls, monitoring measures such as international inspections, and other efforts to prevent material and expertise from reaching programs to develop nuclear weapons. Informed by these lessons, the group sought to develop a set of findings and recommendations to support the policymaking and monitoring communities.