International Relations

377 Items

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, right, and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy address a media conference during a NATO summit

AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis

Paper - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School

Ukraine-NATO Primer: Membership Options Following the 2023 Annual Summit

| July 14, 2023

From July 11-12, 2023, NATO leaders gathered in Vilnius, Lithuania for one of the most significant NATO summits in history. This timely brief by Eric Rosenbach, Grace Jones, and Olivia Leiwant serves as a background piece on Ukraine’s history with NATO, potential future pathways for accession, and the operational impact Ukraine’s NATO membership could have on the alliance. 

Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida

David Mareuil/Pool Photo via AP, File

Analysis & Opinions - Project Syndicate

Japan's Strategic Imperative

| Feb. 02, 2023

Joseph Nye argues that in the face of the threats posed by China, Russia, and North Korea, Japan's self-defense depends more than ever on the strength of its alliances. By significantly increasing its own defense spending and pursuing closer military cooperation with the United States, the current government is moving in the right direction.

U.S. Army Soldiers share tactics and training with Nigerian Army Soldiers, Nigeria, February 8, 2018.

Capt. James Sheehan, U.S. Army

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

The Cult of the Persuasive: Why U.S. Security Assistance Fails

    Author:
  • Rachel Tecott Metz
| Winter 2022/23

Why does the U.S. Army rely on persuasion to influence military partners to improve their forces despite repeated failures that undermine U.S. foreign policy goals? The army prioritizes its role as a fighting force, not an advisory group. U.S. leaders have developed an ideology—the cult of the persuasive—to advance army bureaucratic interests.

A row of T-34 tanks

Wikimedia Commons

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness

    Author:
  • Kendrick Kuo
| Fall 2022

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, military innovation can degrade a state’s military effectiveness as well as strengthen it. In fact, innovation is a gamble that a state may lose, particularly if it is already overextended in its commitments. 

Raising the American flag over Fort Santiago, Manila

Public Domain/George W. Peters

Analysis & Opinions - War on the Rocks

The Psychology of Stickiness: What America Can Learn from Its Annexation of the Philippines In 1898

| May 05, 2022

Aroop Mukharji writes that the moment the United States became a major military power in Asia can be traced to a single day, Oct. 28, 1898. It is a story about the difficulty of letting go, and it teaches scholars and policymakers an important lesson: An everyday psychological bias can lead to years of entanglement. Foreign policy commentary is awash with debates about why one region or another is more or less relevant to U.S. national interests. Those debates are important, but they miss a general point. It is always hard to let go.

Ukrainian servicemen walk to their position at the frontline with with Russia-backed separatists outside Verkhnotoretske village in Yasynuvata district of Donetsk region, eastern Ukraine, Monday, Dec. 27, 2021.

AP/Andriy Andriyenko

Analysis & Opinions - The Hill

What are the best US military options for Ukraine?

| December 12, 2021

Since last April, Russia has been slowly and methodically building up military forces near Ukraine’s border. Those who recall the 1990 U.S. military buildup in advance of the January “Desert Storm” attack to free Kuwait and invade Iraq, will recognize that such a buildup is a serious threat. 

A member of the Afghan security forces walks in the sprawling Bagram air base after the American military departed, in Parwan province north of Kabul, Afghanistan, Monday, July 5, 2021.

AP Photo/Rahmat Gul

Paper

Easier to Get into War Than to Get Out: The Case of Afghanistan

| August 2021

The U.S. should accept with humility its inability to fully eliminate terrorism. Specifically, U.S. policy must balance “ends, ways, and means;” establish clear and achievable objectives; adopt efficient, effective, and resource-sustainable strategies; ensure synchronization of diplomatic and military efforts; build alliances to share the burden of countering terrorism; and leverage cooperative mechanisms and regional partnerships to increase the capacity and willingness of regional states to defend their sovereignty and contribute to multinational coalitions against terrorism.  A balanced, integrated, and synchronized strategy encompassing defense, diplomacy, economic, and humanitarian assistance lines of effort should be cornerstone of a revamped foreign policy in the coming decades.

3rd Marine Division in Vietnam in 1968

U.S. Military Photograph, DOD Media

Analysis & Opinions - PRI's The World

The Stuff of Life and Death: Part II

May 04, 2021

At one point in human history, water’s importance in war went beyond bearing convoys, hiding submarines, and slaking soldiers’ thirst. Water was often itself a weapon. In areas where it was scarce, armies took action to make it scarcer to force besieged enemy cities to capitulate, and in areas where it was abundant, combatants destroyed dams and watched the resulting floods carry their adversaries away. Today, however, most combatants recoil at the use of water as a weapon, and only the most depraved deploy it.

U.S. troops, part of a NATO mission to enhance Poland's defence, are getting ready for an official welcoming ceremony in Orzysz, northeastern Poland, Thursday, April 13, 2017.

AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski

Journal Article - Quarterly Journal: International Security

Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back

| Spring 2021

If the United States were to withdraw from Europe, any European effort to develop an autonomous defense capacity would be fundamentally hampered by profoundly diverging threat perceptions and severe military capacity shortfalls that would be very costly and time-consuming to close.