Articles

Calder Walton recounts how Russia and China are using their intelligence agencies to reverse the outcome of the Cold War

Overall, "sanctions-proofing" activities by governments do not offer an impermeable shield against financial sanctions due to the strength of the US dollar, the reach of multilateral sanctions, and the speed with which coordinated sanctions can be imposed. However, some sanctions-proofing strategies enable governments to continue pursuing their goals despite sanctions pressure. Analysis of Russia's adaptations to the sanctions should temper expectations of sanctions' ability to alter wartime behavior. The threat of sanctions did not deter war and the initial imposition of sanctions did not coerce a change in the decision to wage war.

Do states gain social status by fighting wars? It depends on the type of status order interpreting their belligerence. Russia gained status as a great power within U.S. public discourse after its 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. But its belligerence decreased its status within the G-8 and had little effect on its status in the UN Security Council.

Scott Sagan asked Joseph S. Nye to revisit Nuclear Ethics, a book he published in 1986, in light of current developments in world affairs. In doing so, he found that much had changed but the basic usability paradox of nuclear deterrence remains the same. 

According to the "Madman Theory" outlined by Daniel Ellsberg and Thomas C. Schelling, and embraced by Presidents Richard Nixon and Donald Trump, being perceived as mad can help make seemingly incredible threats—such as starting a nuclear war—more credible. However, recent research has largely concluded that the Madman Theory does not work. 

Great powers may expand their state or empire by choice, or by accident. Nearly 25 percent of important historical instances of great power expansion have been initiated by actors on the periphery without authorization from the center. Leaders at the center are often constrained from withdrawing from new territory, unless they foresee high costs from staying.

Can intelligence serve as a coercive instrument in international relations? While coercion literature mostly addresses military and economic means, this article argues that coercion can also include the deliberate public disclosure of intelligence. Intelligence can be employed to threaten adversaries, reduce their latitude, and force them to adjust their plans and operations

In a conversation with the Harvard Gazette's Alvin Powell, Allison discussed lessons of the John F. Kennedy-Nikita Khrushchev standoff, hard decisions facing President Biden, and the prospect of a cornered Putin. The interview has been edited for clarity and length.

This article analyzes potential courses of action that Russia and the United States could pursue, jointly or separately, to protect the Bering Strait Region from the adverse effects of growing shipping.

Hostile foreign states are using weaponized information to attack the United States. Russia and China are disseminating disinformation about domestic U.S. race relations and COVID-19 to undermine and discredit the U.S. government. These information warfare attacks, which threaten U.S. national security, may seem new, but they are not. Using an applied history methodology and a wealth of previously classified archival records, this article uses two case studies to reveal how and why a hostile foreign state, the Soviet Union, targeted America with similar disinformation in the past