Analysis & Opinions

Stephen Walt argues that when states are in trouble and worried that they might suffer a setback, they toss their principles aside and do what they think it takes to win.

What drove Yevgeny Prigozhin to lead his PMC Wagner troops on a “march for justice” across southern Russia, toward Moscow? Was it a mutiny meant to overthrow Vladimir Putin and install the ex-convict in the Kremlin? Or was the owner and political leader of Russia’s most powerful private army actually — as he assured his followers — trying to convince Putin to meet his demands, which included the firing of his arch-enemies and Russia’s top generals, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, over their poor conduct in the Ukraine war? And what made Prigozhin agree to abort the march toward Moscow, with Wagner’s reconnaissance teams reportedly spotted some 55miles south of the Russian capital, even though his demands had been left unmet? More importantly, has the rebellion weakened Putin, or has it made him stronger? And what’s next for Russia, Ukraine, and other countries whose national interests have been affected by this crisis? Finally, should we be thankful that the “march for justice” turned out the way it went? Despite having combed through hundreds of primary sources over the past several days, I still don’t have definitive answers to all of these key questions, but here’s how I would go about answering some of them if asked to do so, based on what was known as of June 29.

The extraordinary coup attempt by a Russian mercenary leader provides Ukraine with an unexpected opportunity to press whatever advantages it has in its war with Moscow. If it does not seize this chance and break the stasis that governs the battlefield in eastern Ukraine, we will enter a very different chapter in this conflict.

[I]f the Russians are not restrained in causing a major humanitarian and ecological disaster by blowing up a dam — as Ukrainian and Western leaders contend and is a war crime under the Geneva Convention — what else are they capable of? Would they cause a similar or worse calamity if the Ukrainian counteroffensive forces them to retreat from the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant? After all, the Russian military reportedly mined the perimeter of the plant where tons of nuclear material is stored.

As the international community ponders these prospects, the ghost of the Chernobyl catastrophe, the world’s worst nuclear accident that in 1986 covered swaths of Ukraine and Europe in radioactive fallout, returns to haunt. The parallels are uncanny: Chernobyl, the Kakhovka dam destruction, and the potential disaster at Zaporizhzhia all expose the lies of the governments in Moscow and their callous indifference toward massive and needless human suffering.

Grant Golub writes: For decades, Washington has called on U.S. allies to sustain greater shares of the defense burden while largely neglecting to take concrete actions to make this happen. This has helped allow other countries to become dependent on American military protection while letting their own defense capabilities atrophy.

Joseph Nye explores what a second Donald Trump presidency may mean for U.S. foreign policy and the world? While the man himself is unpredictable, his first term and his behavior since losing re-election in 2020 offer plenty of clues, none of which would be comforting to America's allies.

Russia's permanent UNSC membership and presidency of the Council in April 2023 in the context of the country's war in Ukraine represents a mockery of the United Nations as an institution. To better position the UN to address Russia's continued defiance of international law, the UN and the UNSC need to be reformed. Given the difficulty of long-term reform, a set of short-term tools should be employed to address Russia's disregard of the institution's mission of peace.

The following is an event write-up about the recent Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship (PETR) seminar on “France’s Global Role in a Changing World Order” co-moderated by Natalie Colbert, Executive Director of the Belfer Center, and Svenja Kirsch, Fellow with PETR, on April 19, 2023.

In March 2022, seven of the eight Arctic states announced an unprecedented pause in the operations of the Arctic Council in protest of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Elizabeth Hanlon sat down with Arctic Initiative Senior Fellow Fran Ulmer to understand what we might expect when Norway assumes the Chairship of the Council from Russia on May 11, 2023.

Stephen Walt asks that given that winning reelection will take precedence over just about everything else, how will the Biden administration handle foreign policy between now and Election Day?